The European Parliament failed to block the revival of the EU's temporary voluntary message-scanning regime on July 9, 2026 - 314 MEPs opposed it, but the absolute-majority threshold was never reached. With the permanent CSAR talks resuming in September, the fight over scanning and encryption directly shapes the future of anonymity tools.
Telegram has applied to ICANN for the .gram top-level domain, turning usernames into resolvable domains with AI-generated sites behind them. Coming weeks after t.me was suspended under sanctions pressure, the move highlights how infrastructure is drifting away from onion services toward DNS that regulators can actually touch.
The reborn Kimwolf v7 botnet resolves its command servers through Ethereum Name Service across five shuffled endpoints, then falls back to a fixed Tor hidden service if every one of them fails. It is a case study in why onion services remain the most seizure-resistant C2 channel criminals have.
A race condition fixed in Tor 0.4.9.11 allowed a hostile rendezvous point to man-in-the-middle an onion service connection under rare timing conditions. We explain the bug, why the 0.4.8 sunset makes upgrading urgent, and what it means for operators.
Circuits rotate every ten minutes, introduction points shed load, guards drop. Why one failed probe means almost nothing on Tor - and how we retry before believing it.
The Rust rewrite of the tor client has reached client feature parity. What memory safety buys, how the transition is tracking and why relays will be the last to move.
Four years after Tor pulled the plug on v2 onion services, we look back at why the old addresses died, what v3 fixed, and how the ecosystem settled.
From SHA-1 collisions to the October 2021 cutoff: how the Tor Project deprecated v2 onion services, and why thousands of sites initially stayed behind on legacy addresses.
Tor Browser 13 was more than a visual refresh. Its rebase onto Firefox ESR 115 changed how the anonymity browser absorbs security fixes on desktop and Android.
Snowflake turns thousands of volunteer browsers into disposable WebRTC proxies that stand in front of Tor. How the design works, what limits it, and why censors struggle to keep up.
How obfs4 bridges hide Tor traffic inside random-looking bytes, where to request bridge lines from BridgeDB, moat or email, and why active probing still lets censors find them.
WebTunnel disguises Tor bridge connections as everyday HTTPS traffic. We explain how the pluggable transport works and what performance it costs.